ABSTRACT
The primary transmission route for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), a contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals, is by direct contact with infected animals. Yet indirect methods of transmission, such as via the airborne route, have been shown to play an important role in the spread of the disease. Airborne transmission of FMD is referred to as a low probability- high consequence event as a specific set of factors need to coincide to facilitate airborne spread. When conditions are favourable, airborne virus may spread rapidly and cause disease beyond the imposed quarantine zones, thus complicating control measures. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature of foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) within aerosols; how aerosols are generated, viral load, how far aerosols could travel and survive under different conditions. Various studies have investigated emissions from infected animals under laboratory conditions, while others have incorporated experimental data in mathematical models to predict and trace outbreaks of FMD. However, much of the existing literature focussing on FMDV in aerosols describe work which was undertaken over 40 years ago. The aim of this review is to revisit existing knowledge and investigate how modern instrumentation and modelling approaches can improve our understanding of airborne transmission of FMD.
Subject(s)
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus , Foot-and-Mouth Disease , Aerosols , Animals , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Viral LoadABSTRACT
Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.